比亚迪防雷检测招标:帮帮忙 英译中

A third form of accountability is that of retrospective accountability. The traditional model always had some retrospective accountability. The traditional model always had some retrospective mechanisms, particularly for financial probity, and Behn argues it should be possible to establish retrospective accountability for performance ( Behn, 2001, p. 105):

It seems straightforward to adapt the existing, retrospective mechanisms for establishing democratic probity for finances and equity to the new needs of creating a retrospective mechanism for establish democratic for performance. Trust but verify.

Behn’s notion of trust deserves wider consideration. Trust is required of a manager, in that he or she is given a task to do and is then left to do it, without detailed oversight. If later there is verification that the work has been done, that in no way takes away the sense of trust given to the manager in the first place. The alternative, as was seen in an administrative system, is to build up rules, manuals and procedures so that administrators merely follow these through in a machine-like fashion.
Fukuyama draws a distinction between those who operate according to rules and professionals, where ‘the concept of a professional serves as a prototype of a high-trust, relatively unregulated occupation’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 223):

Past a certain point, the proliferation of rules to regulate wider and wider sets of social relationships becomes not the hallmark of efficiency but a sign of social dysfunction. There is usually an inverse relationship between rules and trust each other, and vice versa..

For public management to be regarded as a profession there needs to be more trust and fewer detailed rules. Managers should be allowed to achieve their goals, but, for accountability reasons, there still needs to be verification –trust but verify. The increased use of evaluation of programmers, of formal inquiries, assists this requirement for accountability. Public managers will be trusted to achieve results and to take formal responsibility for doing so, but the achievement of results will face verification.
It is even possible for accountability to be enhanced by the public management reforms. Both organizationally and personally, accountability may be improved because the principals-the politicians and the public-have far better information on the activities of their agents-the public service, while those agents are required to take responsibility for what they do and what they achieve. The managerial changes promise greater transparency, so that achievement of particular programmers can be seen better than was ever the case before. This may actually improve accountability in that failure to achieve objectives should be more visible than under the old system. Yet there are problems of accountability, or potential problems.