妇产科副高护理考试题:谁帮我翻译一下这篇文章（3），谢谢~

Workers with skill sets far behind the latest technology will face higher retraining costs but require lower incentives by the firm for retention, while workers who are better matches to the new technology will face lower retraining costs lower and the incentives required by the firm for retention are higher.
What are the possible HRM systems that firms may set up as a result of the make-buy and retention decisions? Following the literature (above), we define four HRM systems according to their reliance on internal rules (called internal labor markets or ILMs) or on the external labor market (called spot markets), with variation between the two extremes based on assumptions about the firm’s ability to identify worker talent and monitor performance. We characterize the HRM systems according to initial earnings (relative to market initial earnings), variance of earnings at points in time, wage growth over time, and separation rates, with these variable defined for specific cohorts of workers (i.e., same year of entry into firm).
Bureaucratic ILM: Initial earnings of new hires are similar (low variance) since most workers enter at same level and have similar (and reliable) earnings growth. Firm experiences a low separation rate.
Performance-based ILM: Entry of workers and their initial earnings reflect skill requirements, so average initial earnings of new hires are higher with higher variance than for bureaucratic ILM. After approximately two years, workers are selected (based upon performance) for faster career development and members of a cohort compete for entry into these favored positions, which have higher earnings growth and lower separation rates. Those who do not receive skill development have lower earnings growth and higher separation rates.
Spot Market: Firm can identify workers’ talents and skills, and hire and pay accordingly (matching is good). Firm can monitor worker performance and pay worker according to contribution. Initial earnings and earnings growth reflect market rates for skill and talent, with large initial variance, and variance does not increase over tenure. Separation rate is higher than in ILMs.
Spot Market with Rewards: Firm hires and pays workers as in spot market, but identification of worker’s talents and effort at hire is imperfect and monitoring of worker performance is imperfect. Variance of initial earnings is lower than in spot market. Firm must include performance rewards and tournament or wage-efficiency type incentives, thus variance of earnings increases over tenure. Earnings growth is higher than in spot market. Separation rate is higher than in spot market since the bad matches (both at hire and in rewards) end.
Our assumptions about skill and experience requirements based upon the firm’s product market and R&D spending lead us to the following hypotheses about the relationship between choice of HRM and worker productivity: